In 2024, President Biden said he wanted 56% of all new cars sold in the United States to be electric vehicles by 2032. California Governor Gavin Newsom similarly mandated that 35% of new 2026 model cars sold in the state be zero-emissions vehicles, rising to 68% in 2030 and 100% in 2035.

The European Union announced in 2023 that, from 2035 onward, all new cars coming onto the market could not emit any CO2. The United Kingdom similarly announced a 2030 ban on the sale of new diesel and petrol cars.

The reaction from the U.S. auto industry was blunt. The Alliance for Automotive Innovation said it “will take a miracle” for all states following California’s rules to reach 100% new zero-emission vehicle sales by 2035.

They are correct. The environmental impact would be devastating. The people claiming to save the world with electric cars could end up destroying it.

Replacing every vehicle on Earth with an EV, all 1.5 to 1.6 billion of them, would be effectively impossible. There are not enough minerals to manufacture all of the batteries required. In addition, there is not enough global processing capacity, and such a transition would require incredible amounts of labor. Many of these minerals are already being mined by children and by workers laboring under hazardous and toxic conditions that amount to modern slavery.

Across every dimension examined, the answer is the same: a simultaneous global conversion to EVs is physically impossible and would cause environmental and humanitarian damage that rivals or exceeds the problems it claims to solve.

A standard 75 kWh NMC battery pack requires approximately 9 kg of lithium, 13 kg of cobalt, 40 kg of nickel, 25 kg of manganese, and 66 kg of graphite per vehicle. Copper and aluminum are also required for the battery casing, current collectors, and wiring. Multiply those figures across 1.5 billion vehicles and the total mineral demand runs to roughly 13.5 million metric tons of lithium, 19.5 million metric tons of cobalt, 60 million metric tons of nickel, 37.5 million metric tons of manganese, and 99 million metric tons of graphite.

Cobalt is the binding constraint. USGS (U.S. Geological Survey) confirmed reserves stand at roughly 11 million metric tons. A full NMC conversion would require nearly double the entire known reserve base before a single battery reaches a recycling facility. Lithium is the second pressure point: confirmed reserves of 28 million metric tons mean fleet demand alone consumes nearly half of all known lithium, before accounting for grid-scale energy storage or consumer electronics. Graphite reserves of 290 million metric tons and confirmed nickel reserves of around 130 million metric tons are less immediately catastrophic, but a global conversion would still consume a third of graphite reserves and nearly half of nickel. Only manganese, with roughly 1.5 billion metric tons of reserves, clears the demand figure with room to spare.

Battery chemistry is shifting toward lithium iron phosphate. LFP batteries grew from 19% of global market share in 2020 to 55% in 2025, eliminating cobalt and nickel from the cathode. This converts an impossible geological equation into a marginally feasible one, but does not solve the supply chain problem. It just relocates it. Over 98% of LFP cathode material and battery cells are produced in China. Trading cobalt dependence on the DRC for total battery dependence on China substitutes one crisis for another.

Before any mineral reaches a factory, it must be extracted, and the extraction burden is staggering. Production of a single NMC battery requires mining an average of 91 to 607 tonnes of rock. At the midpoint, converting 1.5 billion vehicles implies moving somewhere between 136 billion and 910 billion tonnes of earth, an excavation with no historical precedent. Lithium extraction uses approximately 500,000 gallons of water per metric ton. In Chile’s Salar de Atacama, mining has consumed 65% of the region’s water, forcing some communities to import water entirely.

In Nevada, researchers found damage to fish populations 150 miles downstream from a lithium processing operation. South America’s Lithium Triangle holds more than half the world’s lithium beneath some of the driest terrain on earth; scaling extraction to global fleet demand would accelerate desertification across ecosystems already under severe hydrological stress.

Cobalt compounds the damage with pollution and documented human rights violations. Extraction in the DRC has driven widespread deforestation and soil erosion. Toxic byproducts, arsenic, lead, cadmium, and sulfuric acid, leach into rivers and lakes. An estimated 40,000 children are involved in DRC cobalt mining, some as young as seven, working under unsafe conditions, with elevated cobalt levels in their blood and measurable DNA damage.

The U.S. Department of Labor placed cobalt ore from the DRC on its List of Goods Produced by Child Labor in 2009; the practice persists today. About 80% of industrial cobalt mines in the DRC are owned or financed by Chinese companies. A global EV conversion would multiply cobalt demand by orders of magnitude, meaning the humanitarian disaster in the DRC would have to expand in proportion.

Indonesia’s nickel boom illustrates a separate feedback loop. The rapid buildout of nickel smelting, financed and operated largely by Chinese companies, relies on coal-powered processing facilities carved through tropical rainforest. Overall coal demand for non-power uses grew in 2024, driven by coal-intensive sectors including nickel production in Indonesia. This means that manufacturing the batteries intended to reduce fossil fuel dependence is itself increasing coal combustion in the country, becoming the world’s dominant nickel supplier. The EV supply chain and the coal economy are functioning within the same system.

Manufacturing 1.5 billion battery packs is itself a massive carbon event before a single vehicle moves. An EV has roughly double the production carbon footprint of a comparable internal combustion vehicle. Producing a 75 kWh battery pack alone emits more than seven tonnes of CO2-equivalent. At the manufacturing phase, a battery electric vehicle carries slightly more than 12 tonnes of CO2-equivalent against about 8 tonnes for an ICE vehicle.

Across 1.5 billion vehicles, the manufacturing carbon debt runs to between 6 and 10.5 billion tonnes of CO2-equivalent generated before a wheel turns. Global energy-sector CO2 emissions run to approximately 40.8 gigatons per year; replacing the entire global fleet front-loads the equivalent of several months of total global emissions into the manufacturing phase alone.

Proponents argue EVs recover this debt through lower operational emissions as grids decarbonize. That argument depends on the grid being substantially cleaner than combustion. In much of the world it is not. In 2025, approximately 58% of China’s electricity came from fossil fuels, with coal accounting for just under 55%. A Chinese EV running on that grid is, in energy terms, a coal-powered vehicle with added transmission losses.

The mineral and manufacturing dependencies represent a structural vulnerability with no near-term substitute. China currently accounts for almost two-thirds of global lithium processing, 75% of cobalt processing, 95% of manganese processing, and nearly all graphite processing capacity. Minerals mined in Australia, Chile, the DRC, Indonesia, and Canada largely pass through Chinese processing facilities before reaching a battery factory anywhere in the world.

CATL alone commanded roughly 36 to 38% of the global EV battery market in 2025, while BYD supplied close to 18%, giving Chinese firms a combined share exceeding 70%. South Korean firms, LG Energy Solution, SK On, and Samsung SDI, have seen their share eroded as Chinese producers undercut them on cost and scale.

The consequence is that a global EV fleet would have no redundancy. When there is an oil shock, the world draws on alternative suppliers across dozens of producing nations. A battery supply crisis offers no equivalent diversification. A deliberate Chinese export restriction on processed graphite or refined lithium, restrictions Beijing has already begun testing, or any exogenous disruption to Chinese industrial capacity, would leave Western manufacturers with no viable substitute supply chain. Investment momentum in critical mineral development weakened in 2024, with real investment growth of just 2%, meaning the alternative supply chains that would provide redundancy are not being built at the pace required.

The mineral arithmetic for cobalt alone rules out a full NMC conversion without consuming reserves that do not exist. Shifting to LFP avoids the cobalt wall but surrenders the supply chain to China. The manufacturing phase front-loads billions of tonnes of carbon emissions.

The mining required would devastate water supplies across the Andes, accelerate deforestation in Central Africa and Indonesia, and expand a child labor system the U.S. government has documented for fifteen years without resolution.

In short, the proposition of replacing every vehicle on Earth with an EV fails on every material dimension, and ironically, it would decimate the environment.

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