Clashes erupted in northern Aleppo on January 7, 2026, after Syria’s military opened evacuation corridors for civilians in the predominantly Kurdish neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Achrafieh. About 850 civilians fled before the army’s deadline, after which the areas were declared closed military zones.
The violence killed at least 11 people and wounded dozens across government and Kurdish-controlled areas, with reports of severe food and water shortages inside the neighborhoods. Flights to and from Aleppo were suspended, and schools and government offices shut down.
The Syrian government announced plans for a limited military operation, blaming attacks by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on government-held parts of Aleppo. Damascus warned that SDF positions would be treated as legitimate military targets. The SDF accused government forces of launching heavy assaults on the neighborhoods and said its fighters were resisting to protect civilians.
Kurdish officials accused Damascus of launching a genocidal campaign and said the neighborhoods were effectively besieged, while denying that Kurdish forces there were using heavy weapons. One Kurdish woman explained, “They’re attacking Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo (Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafya). During the time of Al-Assad also the regime was attacking this area because it’s Kurdish areas, and now Jolani (al-Sharaa) also attacking.”
The clashes represent the deadliest confrontation between the two sides since Assad’s fall in December 2024, despite earlier truces. The violence occurred in several waves. October 2025 saw clashes over alleged weapons smuggling tunnels.
December 22, 2025, saw at least two civilians killed during fighting that coincided with Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan’s Damascus visit. January 6-8, 2026, produced the deadliest escalation, with over 46,000 displaced according to Aleppo’s Directorate of Social Affairs. The Syrian government declared Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh “legitimate military targets” on January 7, 2026.
The majority of the neighborhoods’ residents are forcibly displaced people from Afrin. Hundreds of non-Muslim Yazidi Kurdish families in these two neighborhoods were displaced to Aleppo when Turkey and its Syrian armed groups invaded their areas in 2018. These two neighborhoods were already under tight siege by forces affiliated with the Ministry of Defense.
The Kurds adhered to the April 1st agreement, but the other side has not. Despite persistent efforts to initiate negotiations, the Ministry of Defense refuses dialogue. The Syrian people have suffered enough from wars. Kurdish sources maintain that the current Syrian government is a jihadist, terrorist regime that seized power and does not represent the Syrian people, and that people have the right to disagree with the existing form of government and to demand effective participation in the state and fundamental rights as peoples and ethnicities.
The storming of the two Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo will have a profound impact on Rojava, the Kurdish-led area formally known as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. If the Syrian government succeeds, it will embolden them to launch further attacks on northeastern Syria, with expectations of massacres against the Kurds.
On March 10, 2025, Ahmad al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi signed an agreement for the SDF to merge with the Syrian army by December 31, 2025. The deal stalled due to command structure disputes, with Damascus insisting SDF fighters integrate as individuals while the SDF demands maintaining cohesive units with their own command structure. The SDF wants constitutional guarantees for Kurdish autonomy and federalization, which al-Sharaa rejected.
The SDF lacks confidence in Damascus’s ability to protect minorities, particularly after massacres against Alawites, Christians, and Druze in western and southern Syria during 2025. No senior military or security commanders were drawn from minority communities in the new government, and Damascus failed to implement minority representation provisions from the March agreement.
Turkey views the SDF’s core component (YPG) as an extension of the PKK terrorist organization. The entire mobilization was due to Turkey and its policies against the SDF and the Kurds. Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan stated on December 22 that the SDF shows “no intention” to integrate.
Turkish press reported that if integration fails, “Damascus will carry out an operation and [Turkey] will support it.” Turkey has been supplying weapons and military training to Damascus to build leverage against the SDF. The Syrian National Army (SNA), now formally integrated into Syrian forces, remains Turkish-backed and has conducted operations against Kurdish positions throughout 2025.
The SDF controls approximately 30 percent of Syrian territory, including oil and gas fields in northeastern Syria, border crossings with Iraq, the Euphrates River corridor, and agricultural heartland. Failure to integrate means Syria remains divided, with two separate military forces controlling distinct territories. The SDF remains America’s primary counterterrorism partner against ISIS, with U.S. forces embedded in SDF-controlled territory.
Turkey is a NATO ally demanding the SDF’s dissolution. Washington has tried mediating multiple ceasefire agreements (October 2025, December 2025) with limited success. The U.S. maintains sanctions authority under Executive Order 13894 to punish entities threatening Syria’s stability, potentially including Turkey.
If Damascus launches a full offensive against Kurdish areas, Turkey would likely support it through SNA proxies or direct intervention. While Iran lost influence after Assad’s fall, Tehran maintains relationships with some militias that could be activated. Israel has conducted strikes on Syrian military assets and reportedly has indirect contact with Kurdish forces, complicating Turkey’s position. Fighting between Damascus and the SDF would distract from counterterrorism operations against ISIS.
The SDF organized conferences in 2025 bringing together Kurdish, Druze, Alawite, and Arab tribal leaders to advocate for decentralization, which Damascus rejected and cited as justification for canceling negotiations. How this conflict resolves will signal to other Syrian minorities whether the new government will protect pluralism or impose centralized Sunni Islamist control.
As of January 8, 2026, both sides have agreed to temporary de-escalations but violations occur repeatedly. The December 31, 2025 integration deadline passed without implementation, and Damascus-SDF talks have shown no tangible progress. Turkey continues increasing military pressure, with large armored convoys deployed to Turkish-controlled areas of northern Syria. This is not merely a local dispute but a struggle over Syria’s post-war political order, minority rights, and whether centralization or federalization will define the country’s future structure.
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