Every few years, Iran experiences anti-regime protests. Each time, American pundits and the Iranian diaspora predict the fall of the regime. Each time, protesters call for help from abroad. Each time, people die, and after several days or weeks the government regains control. Opponents of the regime are jailed or killed, and the country returns to lockdown.
This time, however, there appears to be a real chance that protests could finally bring an end to the regime. Two factors are different. First, the scale and tenacity of the resistance appear unprecedented compared to previous protests. Second, Donald Trump is sitting in the White House.
Nationwide anti-government protests erupted on December 28, 2025, when shopkeepers in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar closed their businesses in response to the collapse of Iran’s currency and soaring inflation. Demonstrations spread rapidly to all 31 provinces and at least 100 cities, drawing tens of thousands of participants in major urban centers and smaller towns alike.
What began as economic protests quickly transformed into mass political demonstrations demanding the end of the Islamic Republic. Protesters chanted slogans such as “Death to the dictator” and “Death to Khamenei,” while others called for the return of the Shah or Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran’s last monarch, signaling a shift from reformist demands to explicit calls for regime change.
Demonstrators stormed government buildings in multiple cities, including governorate offices, judiciary buildings, and Foundation of Martyrs offices. On January 8, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi called for a peaceful transition and a referendum on Iran’s political future, a message echoed by demonstrators chanting monarchist slogans.
Iran’s security forces responded with an exceptionally violent crackdown under cover of a near-total internet blackout, making the true scale of killings difficult to verify. Forces including the Basij militia and reportedly reinforcements from Iraqi militias used sniper fire, live ammunition, machine guns, tear gas, grenades, and pellet guns.
U.S.-based human rights monitors report death tolls ranging from 217 to more than 2,400, including at least 12 children, while reports from inside Iran suggest the number may reach several thousand or more.
Authorities imposed mass arrests exceeding 16,000 people and initiated expedited trials, including death sentences. Hospitals and morgues have been overwhelmed, bodies have accumulated at forensic centers, and eyewitnesses describe cities resembling war zones. Strikes have spread across bazaars, shops, and energy sectors, further worsening the economic crisis.
The protests are unfolding amid major geopolitical setbacks for Iran. Israel dismantled Iran’s regional strategy by destroying Hamas in Gaza, severely degrading Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iran lost its long-standing ally in Syria with the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024.
A 12-day war with Israel in June 2025, followed by U.S. strikes, destroyed key Iranian air defenses, missile forces, and nuclear infrastructure. The United Nations reimposed sanctions in September 2025, and Trump’s return to the White House revived maximum-pressure policies that deepened Iran’s isolation.
Some intelligence analysts argue Iran may be entering the early stages of regime collapse. Analysts from the Hudson Institute, Brookings Institution, and Atlantic Council describe the regime as weaker than at any point in its history, though others caution that the state retains the capacity for repression.
Despite decades of unrest, unified opposition has remained elusive and no significant defections from the security forces have occurred. The regime’s coercive core, centered on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, remains intact and cohesive.
The IRGC controls a substantial portion of Iran’s economy, dominates intelligence and internal security through the Basij, and was created specifically to safeguard the Islamic Republic’s ideological foundations. Its repeated use of lethal force against past protest movements demonstrates its willingness to preserve power at any cost.
Experience suggests the IRGC will not defect and that protesters cannot defeat it alone. If Khamenei were to flee, that could alter the IRGC’s resolve, but the more likely sequence is that the ayatollah would not flee unless the IRGC either defects or is defeated. The primary wildcard capable of tipping the balance would therefore be U.S. intervention, or strategic strikes by the United States or its allies against the IRGC, senior security officials, or Khamenei himself.
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